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Transfer and templates in scientific modeling 
 
 
Abstract 
The notion of (computational) template has recently been discussed in relation to 
cross-disciplinary transfer of modeling efforts and in relation to the representational 
content of models. We further develop and disambiguate the notion of template and 
find that, suitably developed, it is useful in distinguishing and analyzing different 
types of transfer, none of which supports a non-representationalist view of models. 
We illustrate our main findings with the modeling of technology substitution with 
Lotka-Volterra Competition equations. 
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1. Introduction. One intriguing feature of modeling techniques is that they may be 
applied across scientific disciplines. Harmonic-oscillator models, for instance, are 
seemingly applied wherever there is scientific work to be done. Still, not all models 
are migratory. The Nambu-Goldstone model, for instance, is a staple of quantum field 
theory, but sees no application elsewhere. The evaluation of modeling efforts in 
different contexts of application warrants further analysis – which minimally requires 
a clear identification of what may be transferred between such contexts. On the 
semantic view of models, for instance, transfer could concern the mathematical 
structure (i.e., a system of coupled differential equations), this structure along with its 
interpretation (i.e., the representation of a target system as a harmonic oscillator), or 
anything ‘in between’. 
Recently, (computational) templates have been proposed as the subjects of 
transfer (Humphreys 2002, 2004; Knuuttila 2009, 2011; Knuuttila and Loettgers 
2012). Templates are types of differential equations, such as Lotka-Volterra 
equations, or modeling techniques, such as agent-based modeling, that are primarily 
constructed for their computational tractability, and that can be applied across 
disciplines to phenomena that, in the most extreme case, “may have nothing in 
common ‘physically’” (Humphreys 2002: S4). Remarkably, the notion of template 
has been used to argue for both a “selective” realist and a thoroughgoing 
instrumentalist view of modeling. In particular, the tractability-driven and 
“opportunistic” (Knuuttila 2009: 74) transfer of templates has been used to argue that 
models are epistemic tools, which are constructed and manipulated to contribute to a 
modeler’s understanding, and not (primarily) valued for their representation of target 
systems. Thus, while it seems intuitive to claim that cross-disciplinary modeling 
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efforts
1
 involve transfer of templates, there is a tension in (applications of) the notion 
of template with regard to one of the central philosophical questions regarding 
models. 
In this paper, we argue that the notion of template illuminates cross-
disciplinary modeling efforts, but that it does not support non-representationalism 
with regard to models. We distinguish three types of cross-disciplinary applications of 
modeling efforts, all of which may be understood as transferring templates and not 
interpreted computational models. Where templates are studied independently from 
computational models, there is only transfer in a degenerate sense; and where 
templates are genuinely transferred, this is strongly motivated by applications in 
computational models, valued in their different disciplinary contexts. Still, a marginal, 
but non-negligible role in modeling efforts for studying templates free from any 
specific interpretation shows that templates should not be identified with 
computational models. We illustrate our claims with a case study of transfer: the 
application of Lotka-Volterra Competition (LVC) equations in modeling technology 
substitution. 
 
2. Computational and non-representational templates. The notion of 
computational template was proposed by Paul Humphreys (2002, 2004), in the 
context of emphasizing the importance to science, especially with regard to the 
interconnections between disciplines,
2
 of computational techniques rather than 
                                               
1
 Throughout, “cross-disciplinary modeling efforts” is used where we do not want to 
express commitment about any items (models or templates) that are transferred. 
2
 We use “discipline” to indicate a – not necessarily large – branch of scientific 
research with characteristic subject matter and method(s) of inquiry. 
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theories. Mentioning several examples, including Laplace’s and Lotka-Volterra 
equations and normal distributions, Humphreys argues that some modeling techniques 
see widespread use primarily because of their computational tractability. The notion 
of computational templates is meant to identify what is common to these applications. 
Humphreys distinguishes such templates from computational models: the latter come 
with an interpretation that relates a formalism to a specific subject or target system, 
whereas the former are relatively independent of any specific subject. Thus, 
“templates with different interpretations are not reinterpretations of the same model, 
but are different computational models entirely” (Humphreys 2002: S7). Thus, 
transfer of a modeling technique involves applying the template, not the model, to a 
new subject matter; there is, strictly speaking, no model transfer. 
Humphreys warns against an instrumentalist conception of models, and claims 
that modelers take some parts of their models as true and others as false – in both 
cases expressing ontological commitment rather than the non-commitment that would 
indicate an instrumentalist attitude. Users of a template take a selective-realist 
attitude, by adding to the template (minimally) a subject-dependent correction set, 
which details the effects of relaxing its construction assumptions – the abstractions, 
idealizations, constraints and approximations that went into the construction of the 
template. Moreover, Humphreys maintains that construction of a template is not 
interpretation-free: the template is constructed in the light of its application to specific 
target systems, and at least one (subject-dependent) correction set is co-constructed.
3
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 “The correction set is also always subject-dependent and so, despite its flexibility, is 
the template itself. This is in part because of the inseparability of the template and its 
interpretation, in part because of the connection between the construction of the 
template and the correction set.” (Humphreys 2002: S10). 
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Tarja Knuuttila uses the notion of template in her epistemic-tool account of 
models (e.g., Knuuttila 2009, 2011). On this account, models are primarily “result-
oriented” instruments for increasing the modeler’s understanding of the world. 
Models are purposefully constructed and manipulated, like tools; in particular, in 
evaluating a model, what matters is not its representational relation to target systems, 
but the contribution that its construction and manipulation makes to the realization of 
a given epistemic purpose (e.g., Knuuttila 2011: 263). 
Knuuttila specifically mentions templates in her discussion of the 
“opportunistic” adoption of models constructed in other disciplines.
4
 She emphasizes 
that the cross-disciplinary application of templates is guided first and foremost by 
considerations of tractability or solvability rather than any ability of the transferred 
item to represent accurately the (new) target system. She then uses the latter feature to 
argue against the view that models provide knowledge in virtue of being 
representational, intrinsically or as determined by modeler’s intentions. The cross-
disciplinary and opportunistic use of templates would show that modelers seek to 
“learn from the construction and manipulation of models quite apart from any 
determinate representational ties to specific real-world systems they might have” 
(Knuuttila 2011: 267). As ‘epistemic tools’, models may provide understanding in a 
variety of contexts, none of which is prevalent over others in terms of intrinsic 
representational content or modeler’s intention. Moreover, opportunism is 
recommended, not restricted, in the light of the result-orientedness of modeling: new 
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 “[T]here is an element of opportunism in modelling: the template that has proven 
successful in producing certain features of some phenomenon will be applied to other 
phenomena, often studied within a totally different discipline.” (Knuuttila 2009: 74; 
2011: 268). 
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applications of a template are to be evaluated on the basis of results obtained in the 
new context, not prior to transfer (Knuuttila 2011: 268). Here, a strong positive 
analogy with tools is employed: like tools, models and/or templates may be used for a 
variety of purposes, not all of which are foreseen by the tool’s original designer, and 
many of which require fine-tuning or tinkering on the user’s part before proving their 
true value to the purpose. The only explicit negative analogy is that models serve an 
epistemic, tools a practical purpose.
5
 
Elsewhere, Knuuttila (with Loettgers, 2012) employs the notion of template to 
offer another, more implicit argument for her non-representationalism: templates can 
be constructed without any representational relation to a specific target system in 
mind. To establish this, the construction of Lotka-Volterra models by Volterra and 
Lotka is contrasted. The mathematical biologist Volterra was motivated by empirical 
phenomena regarding a specific target system (marine ecosystems), and only 
constructed a highly idealized set of coupled differential equations to model this 
phenomenon after concluding that a more realistic model would be mathematically 
intractable. By contrast, the general systems theorist Lotka derived the same set of 
differential equations from an abstract theory, irrespective of any specific target 
system, and only then showed that these equations could be applied to model 
oscillations in ecosystems and in concentrations of chemical substances. Thus, the 
very construction of a template may be non-representational – contrary to 
Humphreys’ (2002) claim. 
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 This effectively restricts the analogy to a subclass of tools, since measuring 
instruments such as rulers and cognitive artifacts such as abaci do serve an epistemic 
purpose. 
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Summing up, the notion of template seems to offer a view of transfer of 
modeling efforts that is both plausible and at odds with representationalism or even 
realism regarding models. In what follows, we shall show that the template account 
of, in particular, transfer is in need of further development, which retains its 
plausibility and resolves the apparent tension with a representationalist view of 
models. 
 
3. Cross-disciplinary modeling as transfer of templates. In the previous section, we 
noted that there is a tension in the notion of template: for one author, it supports a 
selective-realist, representationalist view regarding models, for another an 
instrumentalist non-representationalism. One might, in response, opt for abandoning 
the notion. To retain it, we shall in this section develop the notion in such a way that 
the tension is resolved. 
To see why the notion needs developing, consider the claim that cross-
disciplinary applications of modeling efforts involve templates, which are primarily 
valued for their computational tractability. As it stands this claim is uninformative. 
That something serves as a cross-disciplinary template does not make clear why some 
modeling efforts (e.g., involving coupled-oscillator models) see cross-disciplinary 
application and others (e.g., involving Nambu-Goldstone models) do not. Moreover, 
computational tractability cannot provide the sole reason: Nambu-Goldstone 
equations are as computationally tractable as Lotka-Volterra equations, but only the 
latter feature in cross-disciplinary templates. 
Now, within each context of application of modeling efforts, computational 
tractability is valued because it allows derivation of specific implications or 
simulation of specific behaviors. Still, in transferring modeling efforts, both 
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disciplinary interests in and the interpretation of implications and behavior change. 
Balancing these evaluatively relevant aspects is difficult. On the one hand, 
emphasizing the versatility of the transferred items, and the necessary change of 
interpretation may underestimate the reason as to why tractability is still valued, viz., 
because of specific implications or behaviors, of new disciplinary interest – which 
may even be a direct counterpart of the original interests. Emphasizing similarities on 
the level of target systems, on the other hand, runs the risk of wrongfully equating 
templates and models and implying that, because representational content changes 
across applications, models are not primarily intended to represent target systems. 
There is an ambiguity in the very notion of a template that is directly related to 
this balancing act. On one reading, it may refer to a purely formal object, the behavior 
of which can be studied independently of any context of application. On another 
reading, a template may be what computational models, valued in different 
disciplinary contexts, have in common. Although representational content is 
necessarily different in these contexts, this does not entail that the template is valued 
exclusively for its formal properties: the applicability of a template in one discipline 
may still be justified by reference to computational models in another discipline. 
Lotka’s construction of the Lotka-Volterra template illustrates this ambiguity: it may 
be read as construction of a mathematical object, valued only for its tractability; or as 
a starting point for constructing multiple computational models, valued (also) for their 
diverse representational content. 
To resolve the ambiguity and improve our understanding of the role of 
templates in modeling, we may distinguish three types of cross-disciplinary 
applications of modeling efforts. All of these may be understood as transferring 
templates, not computational models. Yet the motivations for these application, and 
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consequently the justification for use of the template, are relevantly different – and 
bring to light the role of interpretations in the evaluation of templates. 
In the first type, modelers in one disciplinary context draw on modeling efforts 
in another discipline, not only because these involve application of computationally 
tractable mathematical structures (typically: sets of differential equations), but also – 
and primarily – because they want to apply the same implications of the 
computational models to similar target systems, or behavior of target systems. In such 
‘conformist transfer’, not only the computational template is transferred, but also – in 
Humphreys’ terms – its construction assumptions and correction set, appropriately re-
interpreted, in order to transfer what is taken to be a central result. In justifications for 
this transfer, one would expect modelers to emphasize similarities between target 
systems, on the level of properties and/or behavior, at least as much as computational 
tractability. Possibly, but not necessarily, this emphasis on similarities takes the form 
of suggesting highly abstract models or encompassing theories, as is also 
acknowledged in cognitive theories of analogical reasoning (e.g., Holyoak and 
Thagard 1995). 
In a second type of transfer, modelers draw on efforts in another discipline 
because they are interested in different implications of the same mathematical 
structure. For such ‘creative transfer’, a more general or extensive evaluation of the 
computational tractability of the template may be required, since the sensitivity of 
previously unstudied implications to construction assumptions must be assessed. This 
might lead to reformulation of the correction set. In justifications of creative transfer, 
one would not expect modelers to emphasize similarities between the properties and 
behavior of target systems and, by contrast, a stronger emphasis on formal analysis or 
general robustness of the template. However, this analysis is not independent from an 
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interpretation of the template in its new context of application: its ability to represent 
behavior of a target system motivates application of the template, even if this behavior 
may have no counterpart, or no counterpart of any disciplinary interest, in the original 
context of application. In the extreme, target systems may have “nothing in common 
‘physically’”.
6
 Here, what is transferred is a template plus interpretation potential. 
Extremely creative transfer must be distinguished from a third type of 
extension of modeling efforts, which can only be called ‘transfer’ in a degenerate 
sense. Here, modelers may study the behavior of a mathematical structure that has 
seen application in one disciplinary context purely out of an interest in its 
computational tractability or its formal implications. They may, for instance, relax 
various constructive assumptions or change parameter settings, not in order to make a 
computational model more realistic, but because they want to test the general 
robustness of a template. Here, the template is studied independently of any context of 
application, even the original one – these investigations strictly speaking study 
template behavior, not model behavior. Moreover, although these modeling efforts 
may not involve transfer, they may prove valuable in justifying subsequent creative 
transfer, and may (but need not) be motivated by the possibility of such transfer. 
Templates are thus involved in a variety of modeling efforts, and only seldom 
independently from (the presentational content of) computational models, valued in 
their different disciplinary contexts. Where templates are studied in independence 
from computational models, there is only transfer in a degenerate sense. Thus, 
although templates are strictly speaking without representational content, and they are 
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 Note just how extreme such a case is, since similarities must be absent (or remain 
unmentioned) on the level of entities, properties, relations and behavior. Analogical 
reasoning must, in short, play no role whatsoever in such transfer of modeling efforts. 
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what is transferred, the phenomenon of transfer can hardly be used in support of a 
non-representationalism regarding models. Still, that there is a role in modeling efforts 
for studying template behavior free from any specific context of application shows 
that templates should not be identified with computational models. 
 
4. A case study: LVC models of technology substitution. In this section, we look at 
one case of transfer of modeling efforts: the modeling of processes of technology 
diffusion with Lotka-Volterra Competition (LVC) equations. We first give a 
necessarily brief description of these modeling efforts in their disciplinary context. 
Then, we analyze some features of these efforts with the notion of template, as it was 
developed and differentiated in the previous section. In particular, we point out a 
distinction between conformist and creative transfer, the importance of application of 
templates in computational models, and a marginal (but non-negligible) role of 
interpretation-free templates. 
Predicting and explaining how technological innovations capture market share 
is of obvious commercial interest. One model of this process fits the simplest logistic 
curve to the growth rates of technologies (Fisher and Pry, 1971), following the 
observation that these rates tend to follow a sigmoid curve after capture of a small but 
significant market share. The (perhaps surprising) predictive success of these and 
other phenomenological models has led to widespread use in industry, and to an 
increasing focus in research on hybridization of existing models for predictive 
purposes,
7
 as well as attempts to construct more explanatory models. 
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 Meade and Islam (1998) review twenty-nine phenomenological models and show 
that a combination provides a better fit to data sets than each of the individual models. 
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One such attempt follows a suggestion by Fisher and Pry that the diffusion of 
innovations can be understood as, primarily, a process of competition between an 
emerging and an established technology. Several researchers have therefore, for 
explicitly explanatory purposes, sought to apply the LVC equations to the growth 
rates of rival technologies. They describe the merits of these models as providing 
“clearly defined assumptions about the nature of technological growth” (Porter et al. 
1991: 197). Often, the behavior of the LVC model is studied in relation to the various 
phenomenological models, for instance by arguing that, under a range of conditions, 
LVC models reduce to Fisher-Pry models (Bhargava 1989). Occasionally, LVC 
equations are directly fitted to data sets of competing technologies. Farrell (1993), for 
instance, applies them to the substitution of soldered cans by lead-free cans, of 
fountains pens by ballpoint pens; and two other substitution processes. 
These modeling efforts are thus explicitly motivated by explanatory concerns, 
expressed in claims that LVC models should provide an understanding of the 
mechanisms of technology substitution. Moreover, the analytic and computational 
tractability of these models plays an important role, in deriving well-established 
phenomenological models as special cases (e.g., Bhargava 1989), in deriving general 
properties of systems of competing technologies (e.g., Saviotti and Mani 1995), or in 
applications to data sets (e.g., Farrell 1993). 
Yet there are at least two strategies for seeking this understanding, reflecting 
the distinction between conformist and creative transfer made in the previous section. 
The first strategy – explicit in, e.g., Bhargava 1989; Porter et al. 1991; Farrell 
1993 – starts from noting the similarity between the logistic (Pearl-Verhulst) growth 
models of ecology and the Fisher-Pry model, where a ‘technological’ counterpart is 
indicated for each element of the biological model: technologies are likened to yeast 
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cultures, growing in an environment with a maximum carrying capacity 
(corresponding to market saturation), etc. Then, it is noted that LVC models should 
comprise Fisher-Pry models as a special case, just as they comprise logistic growth 
models, the technological interpretation of the latter is carried over to the LVC 
equations, and the behavior of these equations that is familiar from biological 
applications (e.g., a bell-shaped growth curve for the ‘defending’ species/technology 
on emergence of a new species/technology) is found in data sets on technology 
substitution. 
A second strategy – explicit in Saviotti and Mani (1995) – involves the same 
template, but strays further from its ecological context of application. It starts by 
constructing a model that is supposed to capture the microeconomic mechanisms 
behind technology substitution: a set of three equations with an elaborate, detailed 
interpretation in terms of obsolescence, learning-by-doing, and purchase of 
intellectual property rights and other factors that have no obvious counterpart in 
ecology – and even for those factors that do, no such counterpart is mentioned. The 
behavior of these equations is not studied, apart from a qualitative reconstruction of 
various modes of competition (perfect, monopolistic, Schumpeterian and inter- and 
intra-technological), mostly known from the economic literature. Only then, the LVC 
equations are introduced, as an “aggregate representation” of technological change, 
with reference to their similar status for ecological change. After some manipulations, 
counterparts of the microeconomic model – especially of the parameters 
corresponding to its distinction between inter- and intra-technological competition – 
are sought; and the behavior of the manipulated equations is simulated to derive a 
relation between technological variety and the relative strength of modes of 
competition, along with the conditions under which the relation holds. 
 14 
 
Both strategies involve transfer of the same template, and in each case, its 
adoption is partly motivated by its tractability (analytical or computational) and partly 
by its interpretability in technological terms. However, the first strategy may be 
identified as strongly conformist, and the second as comparatively creative. This is 
revealed both in the interpretation of the template and in what is presented as its 
relevant behavior and assumptions. The first strategy attempts a term-for-term 
translation, and emphasizes behavior that is familiar from applications in ecology.
8
 
The second interprets the LVC equations in the same terms as a microeconomic 
model, and studies behavior that has no obvious counterpart in ecological 
applications.
9
 This difference also shows in remarks made on the sensitivity of results: 
those that follow the first strategy note that applications of the LVC equations assume 
a stable environment, and find a counterpart in fixed-sized markets; the second 
strategy involves explicit analyses of conditions under which the main results obtain, 
formulated as relevant parameter intervals and ceteris paribus conditions. This 
confirms, with qualifications, Humphreys’ claim that conditions on the applicability 
of the template equations do not feature as ceteris paribus conditions in statements of 
results: they do not feature as such in conformist transfer, but they do in creative use. 
Another feature of templates that is revealed in LVC modeling of technology 
substitution is that transfer of the LVC template is strongly motivated by its 
application in (fully interpreted) computational models. In the first strategy, 
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 Farrell (1993) also seeks to translate the method of applying LVC equations, in order 
to arrive at familiar results. 
9
 Saviotti and Mani (1995) do note in passing that one of their intermediate results has 
an ecological counterpart. 
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technologically meaningful counterparts of virtually all ecological concepts are 
identified before presentation of the result – which is itself a counterpart of a central 
result in ecology. Thus, there is no discernable study of the behavior of the equations 
apart from a prior, and heavily ‘bio-inspired’ interpretation. The second strategy 
differs from the first, not in being interpretation-free, but in interpreting all concepts, 
as well as the central result, in micro-economic terms. Still, a tension between 
interpretability and tractability shows up occasionally. Most notably, Farrell (1993: 
174) cautions against interpreting the interaction terms in the LVC equations in terms 
of comparative technological performance. Such an interpretation, while tempting, 
would neglect that “[t]here is no specific mechanism behind these equations” 
(emphasis added). Here, the formal character of the template is emphasized in order to 
prevent over-interpretation of the equations.
10
 
Finally, in only one place, we find evidence for some interpretation-free 
manipulation of the LVC template in the literature on technology substitution. Morris 
and Pratt (2003) use a rather sophisticated graphical method to derive analytically that 
the LVC equations may “revert” to the Fisher-Pry curves, but that they can only 
mimic, not match, the behavior of other phenomenological models. Although the 
positive result is the same as in papers that exemplify the first strategy, it is here 
derived without any interpretation of either the LVC or the Fisher-Pry equations – and 
the same goes for the negative result, which is unique to this paper. 
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 Farrell goes on to speculate about the possibility to derive a technological model 
from knowledge of the underlying mechanisms – which seems exactly what Saviotti 
and Mani (1995) claim to have done, arriving again at the LVC equations, which are 
now fully (micro-economically) interpreted. 
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There is, summing up, hardly any evidence for an interpretation-free 
application of templates, let alone for non-representational models; in neither of the 
two strategies for transferring the LVC template, the template is applied in isolation 
from computational models. Moreover, the representational content of these models – 
sometimes including a translation of this content from other contexts of application – 
is emphasized by practitioners in their attempts to understand the mechanism(s) of 
technology substitution. Still, we identified a marginal, but non-negligible role in 
these modeling efforts for studying the LVC template free from any specific 
interpretation, illustrating that templates should not be identified with highly abstract 
computational models. 
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